爱华网
Fuhito Kojima（小岛武仁）
Employment
Postdoctoral Associate, Cowles Foundation, Yale University 2008 {2009
Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, Stanford University2009 {
Education
Ph.D. in Economics, Harvard University June 2008
B.A. in Economics, Summa cum Laude, University of Tokyo, Ouchi HyoeBest Thesis
Prize March 2003
Research Interests
Game Theory (matching/assignment problems, auction,evolution/learning),
Market Design,
Political Economics.
Publications
1. Robust Stability in Matching Markets (2010), forthcoming,Theoretical Economics.
2. Substitutes and Stability for Matching with Contracts (2010),with John William Hateld,
forthcoming, Journal of Economic Theory.
3. Asymptotic Equivalence of Probabilistic Serial and RandomPriority Mechanisms (2008), with
Yeon-Koo Che, forthcoming, Econometrica.
4. Axioms for Deferred Acceptance (2007), with Mihai Manea,forthcoming, Econometrica.
5. Incentives and Stability in Large Two-Sided Matching Markets(2009), with Parag A. Pathak,
American Economic Review 99, pp 608-27.
6. Incentives in the Probabilistic Serial Mechanism (2010), withMihai Manea, Journal of Eco-
nomic Theory, 145, pp 106-123.
7. Risk-Dominance and Perfect Foresight Dynamics in N-Player Games(2006), Journal of Eco-
nomic Theory 128, pp 255-273.
8. Impossibility of Stable and Nonbossy Matching Mechanisms (2010),Economics Letters, 107,
pp 69-70
9. Group Incentive Compatibility for Matching with Contracts(2009), with John William Hat-
eld, Games and Economic Behavior, 67, p.745-749
10. Random Assignment of Multiple Indivisible Objects (2009),Mathematical Social Sciences, 57,
134{142.11. Matching with Contracts: Comment (2008), with JohnWilliam Hateld, American Economic
Review 98, pp 1189- 1194.
12. Games of School Choice under the Boston Mechanism with GeneralPriority Structures (2007),
Social Choice and Welfare 31, pp 357-365.
13. The Law of Aggregate Demand and Welfare in the Two-SidedMatching Market (2007), Eco-
nomics Letters 99, pp 581-584.
14. When can Manipulations be Avoided in Two-Sided MatchingMarkets? Maximal Domain
Results (2007), The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics(contribution), Article 32.
15. Matching and Price Competition: Comment (2007), AmericanEconomic Review 97, pp 1027-
1031.
16. Random Paths to Pairwise Stability in Many-to-Many MatchingProblems: A Study on Market
Equilibration (2006), with M. Utku nver, International Journal ofGame Theory 36, pp 473-488
(the Special Issue in Honor of David Gale).
17. Mixed Strategies in Games of Capacity Manipulation inHospital-Intern Markets (2006), Social
Choice and Welfare 27, pp 25-28.
18. p-Dominance and Perfect Foresight Dynamics (2008), with SatoruTakahashi, Journal of Eco-
nomic Behavior and Organization, 68, 689-701.
19. Stability and Instability of the Unbeatable Strategy in DynamicProcesses (2006), International
Journal of Economic Theory 2, pp 41-54. (2006 IJET Lionel W.McKenzie Prize)
20. Anti-Coordination Games and Dynamic Stability (2007), jointwith Satoru Takahashi, Inter-
national Game Theory Review 9, pp 667-688.
21. Bureaucrats or Politicians?: Comment (2008), American EconomicReview 98, pp 561-562.
22. A Theory of Hung Juries and Informative Voting (2007), withYuki Takagi, forthcoming,
Games and Economic Behavior.
23. Matching and Market Design: An Introduction to Selected Topics(a refereed survey), with
Peter Troyan, forthcoming, Japanese Economic Review.
Non-Refereed Publications
1. Matching Market Design (a survey, in Japanese), Keizai Seminar(Economics Seminar), with
Yosuke Yasuda, 2009.
2. Game Theory and Market Design (newspaper articles, in Japanese),The Nikkei, 2009.
3. Frontiers of the School Choice Problem (a survey, in Japanese),with Yosuke Yasuda, in De-
signing School Choice Systems, Yosuke Yasuda (editor), forthcoming,NTT Press; Tokyo.
Working Papers
1. Finding All Stable Matchings with Couples (2007), revise andresubmit, Games and Economic
Behavior.
2. Implementing Random Assignments: A Generalization of theBirkho-von Neumann Theorem
(2009), with Eric Budish, Yeon-Koo Che, and Paul Milgrom
3. The `Boston' School Choice Mechanism (2010), with M. Utkunver
4. Matching with Couples: Stability and Incentives in Large Markets(2010), with Parag A.
Pathak and Alvin E. Roth5. Voter Preferences, Polarization, andElectoral Policies (2009), with Yuichiro Kamada
Editorial Services
Associate Editor, Economic Theory (2009 - present)
