麦克阿瑟 老兵不死 名人演讲稿――麦克阿瑟告别演讲稿 老兵不死(中英文)

麦克阿瑟 老兵不死 名人演讲稿――麦克阿瑟告别演讲稿 老兵不死(中英文)
麦克阿瑟告别演讲“老兵永不死(英文版)

Mr. President, Mr. Speaker, and Distinguished Members of the Congress:

I stand on this rostrum with a sense of deep humility and great pride -- humility in the wake of those great American architects of our history who have stood here before me; pride in the reflection that this forum of legislative debate represents human liberty in the purest form yet devised. Here are centered the hopes and aspirations and faith of the entire human race. I do not stand here as advocate for any partisan cause, for the issues are fundamental and reach quite beyond the realm of partisan consideration. They must be resolved on the highest plane of national interest if our course is to prove sound and our future protected. I trust, therefore, that you will do me the justice of receiving that which I have to say as solely expressing the considered viewpoint of a fellow American.

I address you with neither rancor nor bitterness in the fading twilight of life, with but one purpose in mind: to serve my country. The issues are global and so interlocked that to consider the problems of one sector, oblivious to those of another, is but to court disaster for the whole. While Asia is commonly referred to as the Gateway to Europe, it is no less true that Europe is the Gateway to Asia, and the broad influence of the one cannot fail to have its impact upon the other. There are those who claim our strength is inadequate to protect on both fronts, that we cannot divide our effort. I can think of no greater expression of defeatism. If a potential enemy can divide his strength on two fronts, it is for us to counter his effort. The Communist threat is a global one. Its successful advance in one sector threatens the destruction of every other sector. You can not appease or otherwise surrender to communism in Asia without simultaneously undermining our efforts to halt its advance in Europe.

Beyond pointing out these general truisms, I shall confine my discussion to the general areas of Asia. Before one may objectively assess the situation now existing there, he must comprehend something of Asia's past and the revolutionary changes which have marked her course up to the present. Long exploited by the so-called colonial powers, with little opportunity to achieve any degree of social justice, individual dignity, or a higher standard of life such as guided our own noble administration in the Philippines, the peoples of Asia found their opportunity in the war just past to throw off the shackles of colonialism and now see the dawn of new opportunity, a heretofore unfelt dignity, and the self-respect of political freedom.

Mustering half of the earth's population, and 60 percent of its natural resources these peoples are rapidly consolidating a new force, both moral and material, with which to raise the living standard and erect adaptations of the design of modern progress to their own distinct cultural environments. Whether one adheres to the concept of colonization or not, this is the direction of Asian progress and it may not be stopped. It is a corollary to the shift of the world economic frontiers as the whole epicenter of world affairs rotates back toward the area whence it started.

In this situation, it becomes vital that our own country orient its policies in consonance with this basic evolutionary condition rather than pursue a course blind to the reality that the colonial era is now past and the Asian peoples covet the right to shape their own free destiny. What they seek now is friendly guidance, understanding, and support -- not imperious direction -- the dignity of equality and not the shame of subjugation. Their pre-war standard of life, pitifully low, is infinitely lower now in the devastation left in war's wake. World ideologies play little part in Asian thinking and are little understood. What the peoples strive for is the opportunity for a little more food in their stomachs, a little better clothing on their backs, a little firmer roof over their heads, and the realization of the normal nationalist urge for political freedom. These political-social conditions have but an indirect bearing upon our own national security, but do form a backdrop to contemporary planning which must be thoughtfully considered if we are to avoid the pitfalls of unrealism.

Of more direct and immediate bearing upon our national security are the changes wrought in the strategic potential of the Pacific Ocean in the course of the past war. Prior thereto the western strategic frontier of the United States lay on the littoral line of the Americas, with an exposed island salient extending out through Hawaii, Midway, and Guam to the Philippines. That salient proved not an outpost of strength but an avenue of weakness along which the enemy could and did attack.

The Pacific was a potential area of advance for any predatory force intent upon striking at the bordering land areas. All this was changed by our Pacific victory. Our strategic frontier then shifted to embrace the entire Pacific Ocean, which became a vast moat to protect us as long as we held it. Indeed, it acts as a protective shield for all of the Americas and all free lands of the Pacific Ocean area. We control it to the shores of Asia by a chain of islands extending in an arc from the Aleutians to the Mariannas held by us and our free allies. From this island chain we can dominate with sea and air power every Asiatic port from Vladivostok to Singapore -- with sea and air power every port, as I said, from Vladivostok to Singapore -- and prevent any hostile movement into the Pacific.

*Any predatory attack from Asia must be an amphibious effort.* No amphibious force can be successful without control of the sea lanes and the air over those lanes in its avenue of advance. With naval and air supremacy and modest ground elements to defend bases, any major attack from continental Asia toward us or our friends in the Pacific would be doomed to failure.

Under such conditions, the Pacific no longer represents menacing avenues of approach for a prospective invader. It assumes, instead, the friendly aspect of a peaceful lake. Our line of defense is a natural one and can be maintained with a minimum of military effort and expense. It envisions no attack against anyone, nor does it provide the bastions essential for offensive operations, but properly maintained, would be an invincible defense against aggression. The holding of this littoral defense line in the western Pacific is entirely dependent upon holding all segments thereof; for any major breach of that line by an unfriendly power would render vulnerable to determined attack every other major segment.

This is a military estimate as to which I have yet to find a military leader who will take exception. For that reason, I have strongly recommended in the past, as a matter of military urgency, that under no circumstances must Formosa fall under Communist control. Such an eventuality would at once threaten the freedom of the Philippines and the loss of Japan and might well force our western frontier back to the coast of California, Oregon and Washington.

To understand the changes which now appear upon the Chinese mainland, one must understand the changes in Chinese character and culture over the past 50 years. China, up to 50 years ago, was completely non-homogenous, being compartmented into groups divided against each other. The war-making tendency was almost non-existent, as they still followed the tenets of the Confucian ideal of pacifist culture. At the turn of the century, under the regime of Chang Tso Lin, efforts toward greater homogeneity produced the start of a nationalist urge. This was further and more successfully developed under the leadership of Chiang Kai-Shek, but has been brought to its greatest fruition under the present regime to the point that it has now taken on the character of a united nationalism of increasingly dominant, aggressive tendencies.

Through these past 50 years the Chinese people have thus become militarized in their concepts and in their ideals. They now constitute excellent soldiers, with competent staffs and commanders. This has produced a new and dominant power in Asia, which, for its own purposes, is allied with Soviet Russia but which in its own concepts and methods has become aggressively imperialistic, with a lust for expansion and increased power normal to this type of imperialism.

There is little of the ideological concept either one way or another in the Chinese make-up. The standard of living is so low and the capital accumulation has been so thoroughly dissipated by war that the masses are desperate and eager to follow any leadership which seems to promise the alleviation of local stringencies.

I have from the beginning believed that the Chinese Communists' support of the North Koreans was the dominant one. Their interests are, at present, parallel with those of the Soviet. But I believe that the aggressiveness recently displayed not only in Korea but also in Indo-China and Tibet and pointing potentially toward the South reflects predominantly the same lust for the expansion of power which has animated every would-be conqueror since the beginning of time.

The Japanese people, since the war, have undergone the greatest reformation recorded in modern history. With a commendable will, eagerness to learn, and marked capacity to understand, they have, from the ashes left in war's wake, erected in Japan an edifice dedicated to the supremacy of individual liberty and personal dignity; and in the ensuing process there has been created a truly representative government committed to the advance of political morality, freedom of economic enterprise, and social justice.

Politically, economically, and socially Japan is now abreast of many free nations of the earth and will not again fail the universal trust. That it may be counted upon to wield a profoundly beneficial influence over the course of events in Asia is attested by the magnificent manner in which the Japanese people have met the recent challenge of war, unrest, and confusion surrounding them from the outside and checked communism within their own frontiers without the slightest slackening in their forward progress. I sent all four of our occupation divisions to the Korean battlefront without the slightest qualms as to the effect of the resulting power vacuum upon Japan. The results fully justified my faith. I know of no nation more serene, orderly, and industrious, nor in which higher hopes can be entertained for future constructive service in the advance of the human race.

Of our former ward, the Philippines, we can look forward in confidence that the existing unrest will be corrected and a strong and healthy nation will grow in the longer aftermath of war's terrible destructiveness. We must be patient and understanding and never fail them -- as in our hour of need, they did not fail us. A Christian nation, the Philippines stand as a mighty bulwark of Christianity in the Far East, and its capacity for high moral leadership in Asia is unlimited.

On Formosa, the government of the Republic of China has had the opportunity to refute by action much of the malicious gossip which so undermined the strength of its leadership on the Chinese mainland. The Formosan people are receiving a just and enlightened administration with majority representation on the organs of government, and politically, economically, and socially they appear to be advancing along sound and constructive lines.

With this brief insight into the surrounding areas, I now turn to the Korean conflict. While I was not consulted prior to the President's decision to intervene in support of the Republic of Korea, that decision from a military standpoint, proved a sound one, as we -- as I said, proved a sound one, as we hurled back the invader and decimated his forces. Our victory was complete, and our objectives within reach, when Red China intervened with numerically superior ground forces.

This created a new war and an entirely new situation, a situation not contemplated when our forces were committed against the North Korean invaders; a situation which called for new decisions in the diplomatic sphere to permit the realistic adjustment of military strategy.

Such decisions have not been forthcoming.

While no man in his right mind would advocate sending our ground forces into continental China, and such was never given a thought, the new situation did urgently demand a drastic revision of strategic planning if our political aim was to defeat this new enemy as we had defeated the old.

Apart from the military need, as I saw It, to neutralize the sanctuary protection given the enemy north of the Yalu, I felt that military necessity in the conduct of the war made necessary: first the intensification of our economic blockade against China; two the imposition of a naval blockade against the China coast; three removal of restrictions on air reconnaissance of China's coastal areas and of Manchuria; four removal of restrictions on the forces of the Republic of China on Formosa, with logistical support to contribute to their effective operations against the common enemy.

For entertaining these views, all professionally designed to support our forces committed to Korea and bring hostilities to an end with the least possible delay and at a saving of countless American and allied lives, I have been severely criticized in lay circles, principally abroad, despite my understanding that from a military standpoint the above views have been fully shared in the past by practically every military leader concerned with the Korean campaign, including our own Joint Chiefs of Staff.

I called for reinforcements but was informed that reinforcements were not available. I made clear that if not permitted to destroy the enemy built-up bases north of the Yalu, if not permitted to utilize the friendly Chinese Force of some 600,000 men on Formosa, if not permitted to blockade the China coast to prevent the Chinese Reds from getting succor from without, and if there were to be no hope of major reinforcements, the position of the command from the military standpoint forbade victory.

We could hold in Korea by constant maneuver and in an approximate area where our supply line advantages were in balance with the supply line disadvantages of the enemy, but we could hope at best for only an indecisive campaign with its terrible and constant attrition upon our forces if the enemy utilized its full military potential. I have constantly called for the new political decisions essential to a solution.

Efforts have been made to distort my position. It has been said, in effect, that I was a warmonger. Nothing could be further from the truth. I know war as few other men now living know it, and nothing to me is more revolting. I have long advocated its complete abolition, as its very destructiveness on both friend and foe has rendered it useless as a means of settling international disputes. Indeed, on the second day of September, nineteen hundred and forty-five, just following the surrender of the Japanese nation on the Battleship Missouri, I formally cautioned as follows:

Men since the beginning of time have sought peace. Various methods through the ages have been attempted to devise an international process to prevent or settle disputes between nations. From the very start workable methods were found in so far as individual citizens were concerned, but the mechanics of an instrumentality of larger international scope have never been successful. Military alliances, balances of power, Leagues of Nations, all in turn failed, leaving the only path to be by way of the crucible of war. The utter destructiveness of war now blocks out this alternative. We have had our last chance. If we will not devise some greater and more equitable system, Armageddon will be at our door. The problem basically is theological and involves a spiritual recrudescence and improvement of human character that will synchronize with our almost matchless advances in science, art, literature, and all material and cultural developments of the past 2000 years. It must be of the spirit if we are to save the flesh.

But once war is forced upon us, there is no other alternative than to apply every available means to bring it to a swift end.

War's very object is victory, not prolonged indecision.

In war there is no substitute for victory.

There are some who, for varying reasons, would appease Red China. They are blind to history's clear lesson, for history teaches with unmistakable emphasis that appeasement but begets new and bloodier war. It points to no single instance where this end has justified that means, where appeasement has led to more than a sham peace. Like blackmail, it lays the basis for new and successively greater demands until, as in blackmail, violence becomes the only other alternative.

"Why," my soldiers asked of me, "surrender military advantages to an enemy in the field?" I could not answer.

Some may say: to avoid spread of the conflict into an all-out war with China; others, to avoid Soviet intervention. Neither explanation seems valid, for China is already engaging with the maximum power it can commit, and the Soviet will not necessarily mesh its actions with our moves. Like a cobra, any new enemy will more likely strike whenever it feels that the relativity in military or other potential is in its favor on a world-wide basis.

The tragedy of Korea is further heightened by the fact that its military action is confined to its territorial limits. It condemns that nation, which it is our purpose to save, to suffer the devastating impact of full naval and air bombardment while the enemy's sanctuaries are fully protected from such attack and devastation.

Of the nations of the world, Korea alone, up to now, is the sole one which has risked its all against communism. The magnificence of the courage and fortitude of the Korean people defies description.

They have chosen to risk death rather than slavery. Their last words to me were: "Don't scuttle the Pacific!"

I have just left your fighting sons in Korea. They have met all tests there, and I can report to you without reservation that they are splendid in every way.

It was my constant effort to preserve them and end this savage conflict honorably and with the least loss of time and a minimum sacrifice of life. Its growing bloodshed has caused me the deepest anguish and anxiety.

Those gallant men will remain often in my thoughts and in my prayers always.

I am closing my 52 years of military service. When I joined the Army, even before the turn of the century, it was the fulfillment of all of my boyish hopes and dreams. The world has turned over many times since I took the oath on the plain at West Point, and the hopes and dreams have long since vanished, but I still remember the refrain of one of the most popular barrack ballads of that day which proclaimed most proudly that "old soldiers never die; they just fade away."

And like the old soldier of that ballad, I now close my military career and just fade away, an old soldier who tried to do his duty as God gave him the light to see that duty.

Good Bye.

麦克阿瑟告别演讲“老兵永不死(中文版)

总统先生,演讲者,议会杰出的成员们:

我怀着深深的谦卑和无比的自豪感站在这演讲台上----谦卑是因为面对在我面前的那些伟大美国过去的建设者们;自豪是因为想到国内立法争论所设计的代表人类最纯洁的自由。整个人类的希望、抱负、信念都集中于此。我站在这里不为任何党派目的辩护,因为议题的根本性超出了党派所能考虑的区域。如果能证明我们的路线稳妥且我们的前途有保障,那些问题就应被放在最高位来解决.因此,我相信,你们会公正地把我所表达的当作一个美国同胞的观点。

我演讲既不带人生暮年的怨恨也不带伤感之情,但心中只有一个目的:为我的祖国效劳。虽然亚洲被认为是通往欧洲的大门,但说欧洲是通往亚洲的大门也没有错。且一方的广泛影响不得不带动另一方。一些人声称我们的力量不足以同时保护两条线路,我们不能分散精力。我认为没有比这更能表现出失败主义的了。如果潜在性的敌人能将他们的力量分为两条路线,那对我们来说就要对他们的力量予以反击。共产主义者的威胁是一个全球性的问题。他们在每个防区的成功进展直接预示着我们每隔一个防区将遭到破坏。我们不会为让亚洲的共产主义投降而不能同时削弱我们的力量去遏止欧洲的发展而感到安慰。

说了太多的共知之理,我会简略我关于亚洲地区的讨论。在某人能客观地对那里存在的形势作出评估之前,他必须了解一些关于亚洲的过去和他们沿着自己的路线发展至今的改革变化。被所谓的殖民统治长期的剥削,便很难有机会建立社会的公正尺度,维护个人尊严,或者实现一个高水平的生活,就像保卫我们在菲律宾自己崇高的政府,亚洲的人民抓住了他们的时机在战争中摆脱了殖民统治的束缚并且看到了新时机的曙光,一种从未感受过的尊严和一个国家自由后的自尊感。

集合地球一半的人数,有60%的自然资源被这些人迅速地加强成为一种新的力量,精神上的和物质上的都被用来提升生活水平也是为适应对自己的不同文化环境的最新进展的谋划。不管谁是否拘泥于殖民的概念,这是亚洲发展进步的方向且不会被终止。这是世界金融尖端转变的必然结果,就像整个世界事物的中心正循环着回到它的起始点。

在这种形势之下,我们用基本发展的状况使自己国家和东方国家在政策上保持和谐而不是一味追求不明现实的路线,因为殖民时代已经过去且亚洲人正为实现他们自由的命运而垂延。他们当今寻求的是友好的指引、协议、和支持――而不是专横的引导――是平等尊严而不是耻辱地屈从。他们战前的生活标准低得令人同情,现在又因战争所带来的破坏而变得更加无限的低。【名人演讲稿――麦克阿瑟告别演讲稿:老兵不死(中英文)】。世界的意识形态几乎不把亚洲考虑在内,不给予他们体谅。那儿的人民为之拼命的只是为了能得到更多一点食物来填饱肚子,有稍好一点的衣物来遮背,盖结实些的屋顶在他们的头上,和普通国民们渴望政治自由的意识。这些政治社会性的条件为国内安全给予了间接的保障,不过要对慎重考虑过的现时方案建立背景来决定我们是否要避免不切实际的意外事件。

能直系和快速地稳固住国内安全的是过去太平洋战争路线战略上的改变。先前的美国西面战略部署是美国原本线路,附和着暴露的岛屿夏威夷、中途岛、关岛通向菲律宾。这种战线证明了不是敌方前哨的力量而是我方暴露的弱点使敌人有机可乘太平洋地区是个令任何强国都虎视眈眈谋求发展和扩张领土的地方。所有一切都被太平洋战争的胜利改变了,我们那具有战略意义的边界才成为我们所拥有的整个太平洋,只要我们能够抓住它便能使其成为巨大的护城河。千真万确,它充当的是所有美国乃至整个太平洋自由领土的护盾。我们控制亚洲成弧形链状海岸线的岛屿从琉球到马尼拉都受我们和盟军控制。由这诸些岛屿我们能支配从海参葳到新加坡亚洲港口的海洋和空中力量――有了海洋上的和空中的力量――如我所说的――从海参葳到新加坡――保护并抵御太平洋上不友好的动机。

在亚洲任何凶狠的进攻都必须具备两股力量。无任何两种力量能在没有海洋和空中的掌控权之下在推进道路上取得成功。有了海军、重要的空军和适度的陆军来保卫基地,任何对亚洲大陆的以及我们和我们在太平洋上的朋友的蓄意攻击都必将逃不了失败的厄运。

在如此状况下,太平洋代表的不仅仅是预想中的侵略者的一种威胁。假定那里是个友好的和平湖畔,我们的防御路线就十分自然而且可花费最小的军事代价来维持。想象没有任何袭击,也用不着为突袭性的攻击而设置堡垒,只要适当维护,这将是抵制侵略的不可战胜的防御。

在西太平洋上想拥有这种防御力因此要依赖各个部分,因为不友好的力量导致的任何线路破裂都会遭来每个部分在有预谋的攻击下变得十分脆弱。

这是我仍在寻找的要接替我的军事领头者应当持有的军事评估。因为这个原因,我过去强烈地推荐自己,成为一个至关重要的军事代理,没有稳固的经济基础台湾就只能在共产主义的掌控下。这样一个世界有可能立刻就威胁到菲律宾和失败后的日本的自由,也会迫使我们西方的防守边界退到加利福尼亚沿岸、奥勒岗和华盛顿。

要了解中国大陆所发生的变化,就必须知道50年来中国体制和文化的变化。中国,50年前是完全没有团结意识,分裂成很多团体互相争斗。【名人演讲稿――麦克阿瑟告别演讲稿:老兵不死(中英文)】。经过过去的五十年中国人开始有了武装的概念和理想。如今他们组成了拥有胜任的参谋长和司令的优秀士兵团体。这就在亚洲诞生了一股新的统治力量,为了实现自己的目标,他们与观念方法都成了具帝国主义的苏联结盟,同时他们也带着扩张领土、增强实力的渴望趋向帝国主义。

他们都使用精力来扭曲我的职位。结果我被说成了是个好战分子。没有事物能够越加远离真理。我明白现在活着的人当中几乎没多少能真正了解战争,没有比这更令我心情不悦的了。因为对朋友和敌人带来的破坏已经致使一系列国际上的争论都毫无用处,我倡导这项废除令很久了。事实上,在1945年9月2日,就跟在日本国在密苏里号战舰上投降后,我正式警告如下:

“人类从一开始就寻求和平。不同的时代各式各样的方法都被用来设计国际性的进程,来平息和解国与国之间的争论。有许多可行性的方法是被个别的公民发掘的,但是在一个巨大的国际范围中,技术工人用单一的手段还从未成功过。军事的联盟,实力的平衡,国家的结盟,轮流着失败,留下这唯一的路径来当作战争的严酷考验。战争带来的整个破坏现在产生了二选一。我们只有最后的机会。如果我们我们不能设计出一些更好更公平的制度,大决战将近在咫尺。问题是神奇的,它涉及到一种精神的再生和人类性格的改进,将与我们在科学、艺术、文学及所有物质文化2000年来的发展近乎史无前例的同步进展。如果我们要保存肉体就必须有精神作支撑。”

但是一旦战争逼迫着我们发生,那就没有选择的尽力使战争尽快结束。战争的目的是为了胜利,而不是为了无休止的延长。战争中没有东西能代替胜利。有一些人因为各种原因要安慰红色中国。他们无视历史的教训,因为历史无庸质疑地强调了抚慰只能招致更血性的战争。就像敲诈勒索,它爆发于连续不断的新的需求,在威胁中,暴力成为了仅存的另外选择。“为什么?”我的士兵问我,“难道要我们在战场上放弃对敌人的优势?”我无言以对。

有人会说:和中国携手进行一次全力以赴的战争来避免冲突的传播;另外,要避免苏联的干涉。似乎没有一种解释是有效的,因为中国已经表明有了最大限度的影响力,且苏联不会迎合我们的步伐。就如一条眼镜蛇,当新的敌人感到军事上的相互依存或者别的遍及世界的潜在诱惑,他们就很可能会发动进攻。

事实使韩国的悲剧更为加深了,军事行动缩小了他们的国界。【名人演讲稿――麦克阿瑟告别演讲稿:老兵不死(中英文)】。那个我们要拯救的国家、他们要饱受整个海军和空军毁灭性的对抗,然而敌人的地盘却在如此的攻击和破坏之下全全得到保护,这是受到谴责的。在世界上所有的国家中,韩国是仅存的唯一冒险反对共产主义的国家。韩国人民巨大的勇气和刚毅拒绝描述。比起奴隶身份他们情愿选择了拼死。他们对我留下的最后一句话是:“决不能逃离太平洋!”我只为你们留下了英勇善战的儿子们。他们在那遇到了各种各样的考验,我会毫无保留地向你们汇报他们在每个方面都很出色。

我持久地尽我所能去保护他们光荣地结束这场野蛮的冲突,并且要花费最少的时间,付出最小的牺牲。那些日趋增长的杀戮给我带来了极度的痛苦和忧虑。那些勇敢的人们永久地留在我的脑海中以及我的祈祷文里。

我即将结束我52年的戎马生涯了。还在本世纪开始前当我加入陆军时,我孩提时代所有的希望和梦想便实现了。自从我在西点广场上虔诚地宣誓以来,世界已几经倾覆,希望和梦想也早已消失,但我仍记得那时最流行的一首军歌中的句子,它自豪地宣布:

“老兵永远不死,他们只是悄然隐去。”

像那首歌中的老兵一样,我作为一名在上帝的光辉下尽心尽职的老兵,现在结束我的军事生涯,悄然隐去。

再见。
名人演讲稿:名人励志演讲稿:

  

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